How Dual-Carrier War Drills in Pacific Bring New Tactics, Advantages – Kris Osborn

The following piece first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.

Earlier this year, two massive US Navy aircraft carriers were projected to power in the Philippine Sea in close proximity to one another in what appears to be a deliberate effort to prepare for any ability to potentially project an extremely powerful, large, and sustained air attack campaign in the Pacific. The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group performed routine war preparation exercises right alongside the USS Vinson (CVN-70) within striking distance of Taiwan’s airspace.

“Dual carrier operations are an example of the US Navy exercising to operate at scale in a major conflict. The carrier battle group, as a rule, is all-domain. Dual carrier ops and other integrated exercises at scale are essential for great power conflict. They provide a deterrent effect that tells would-be adversaries we have enough firepower to be where we need to be,” said Ret. Maj. Gen. David Coffman, former Director of US Navy Expeditionary Warfare, senior Warrior Naval warfare expert.

The scale and scope of these kinds of operations, which essentially deliver two combined massive floating airports, widen the operational envelope and greatly increase attack volume, dwell time, and mission endurance, as aircraft can quickly replace or supplement one another over a given target area. This can also decrease any need for aerial refueling, something which can be quite dangerous over hostile areas as most large tankers are non-stealthy and vulnerable to enemy air defenses. With extra sorties and attack aircraft volume, dwell time over targets can be greatly extended as newly arriving aircraft replace ones operating over a target area.

A major challenge, as well as a major advantage of these kinds of scaled operations, resides in the realm of Command and Control, Coffman explained.

“A Carrier task force built to be an autonomous, self-contained thing, a composite warfare structure. Dual-carrier ops merge these structures’ command and control,” Coffman said.

There are many command and control advantages to these kinds of operations, provided transport layer connectivity is both assured and secured. Carriers likely have radio connectivity between them, something that enables operational synergy and coordination. Fighter jet sorties can be properly staggered, scaled, and integrated to ensure any air attack campaign achieves its intended impact.

Secondly, each carrier operates with an impactful number of F-35C aircraft, 5th-generation stealth planes with a common Multi-functional Advanced Data Link (MADL), enabling all F-35s to seamlessly and immediately share data, voice, video, and other targeting and operational specifics in flight. This means F-35s in high-threat areas can quickly alert other F-35Cs and Marine Corps F-35Bs of high-threat areas, enemy activity, or locations of air defenses.

MADL operates with a significant range, so in the event that one group or formation of F-35s encounters a heavy concentration of enemy fighters and targets, reinforcements can be called quickly.

This ability is fortified by a growing ability for 5th-generation aircraft to exchange information with 4th-generation aircraft in flight, enabling 5th-gen fighters to use stealthy and long-range sensing to identify and destroy enemy air defenses. This kind of operation would be designed to create a safer “air corridor” for 4th-generation aircraft to enter with less risk of being destroyed by ground-fired air defenses or ship-based anti-aircraft guns.

Why 2-Carries are Critical in Pacific

The largest advantage with any kind of “scaled” 5th-generation attack may be in the area of air superiority and an ability to potentially track and destroy a Chinese amphibious assault.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force, for example, does not yet operate an ocean-launched 5th-generation aircraft and currently has only a few prototypes of its emerging carrier-launched J-31 5th-gen stealth aircraft. While the PLA Air Force has the J-20, it is land-launched and may be less effective in a maritime scenario.

The island of Taiwan is only 100 miles from mainland China, placing the air space within reach of land-launched J-20s. However, it is by no means clear that the J-20 can rival US 5th-generation aircraft.

Available specs on the J-20 seem to indicate it is larger and potentially less maneuverable than rival US 5th-generation aircraft, but the aircraft is apparently capable of operating in a “bomb-truck” mode carrying up to 24,000 pounds of ordnance. This factor, while likely impactful in any kind of land engagement enabled by air superiority, is not likely to bring much value to any effort to establish air superiority above Taiwan and areas in the Pacific.

As an aircraft restricted to land take, the J-20 would also operate with much less “dwell time” in the skies above the Pacific, making it difficult for the PLA Air Force to sustain any kind of protracted air-attack campaign.

Added to this equation, there are estimated to be only a little more than 100 operational Chinese J-20s, so PLA 5th-generation aircraft would likely be outnumbered and challenged to operate hundreds of miles offshore. Any Pacific conflict is likely to not only be focused on the areas around Taiwan but also extend hundreds of miles across the Pacific, areas where the US and its allies are quite likely to operate with air superiority.

All of these factors suggest that any PLA Navy amphibious assault on Taiwan is likely to operate without air superiority, a factor that naturally makes their surface forces extremely vulnerable to the air. US, Japanese, South Korean, and perhaps even Singaporean F-35s in the future would be positioned to not only protect forward operating US Navy carriers within range of Taiwan but also conduct air-to-surface attacks.

All of these variables would seem to contribute to the many reasons why the US Navy seems regularly inclined to conduct dual-carrier operations in the Pacific theater.

Multiple Carriers in the Pacific? F-35 Projection

There is little question that, apart from perhaps leveraging undersea superiority, any sustained deterrence against a rapid Chinese annexation of Taiwan or aggressive actions in the South China Sea likely pertain to the availability and reach of US and allied 5th-generation aircraft. A cursory look at PLA Air Force aircraft would seem to suggest that the PRC would, at least at the moment, have trouble establishing any kind of air superiority in the Pacific, provided sufficient numbers of F-35 were within striking distance.

While there are some options to launch land-based F-35s from Japan, Korea, and eventually Singapore, the most decisive or impactful deployment of US and allied 5th-generation air power would most likely come from the sea. The massively increasing US military presence in the Philippines will likely present additional opportunities for the US to station F-35s at newly arriving US bases in the country, yet despite the realistic prospect of large-scale land deployment of F-35s, the collective US and allied ability to operate F-35s from the sea could prove to be the most decisive element in any conflict with the PRC.

The F-35 is now exploding across the Pacific with Japan’s massive buy along with Singaporean and South Korean F-35s. Japan has already deployed its F-35B aircraft on its warships and the US Navy’s America-class amphibious assault ships can deploy with as many as 20 F-35Bs. Perhaps of greatest impact, the US Navy can easily launch 50 or more F-35Cs from a single carrier, creating a scenario in which the US and its allies could, in effect, blanket the region with 5th-generation air power.

Two-Carriers in Pacific to Five

These circumstances raise the interesting question that, given the massively increasing tensions in the Pacific between an allied US, Japanese and Philippine Navy, and China, it might make sense for the Navy to massively increase its deployment of carriers in the Pacific from the usual two or three all the way up to five. The idea of increasing the number of US Navy carriers deployed in the Pacific to five was suggested recently in an interesting essay from the “Center for China Analysis.”

“Recent reporting suggests that the United States is likely to increase the number of its aircraft carriers deployed in the Western Pacific this year from three to five,” wrote Lyle Morris, a Senior Fellow at the Center for China Analysis.

The reason for this seems both clear and simple, as it pertains to volume and any US-led ability to massively project air power from the sea. With 5 aircraft carriers strategically positioned across the region, a combined US and Japanese force of ocean-launched F-35s could, in effect, generate an aerial “wall” of 5th-generation support encircling at-risk areas near Taiwan and the South China Sea.

This possibility has likely been thrust to the forefront of Pentagon and US Navy thinking following recent large-scale escalations in tensions between an allied US-Philippine force and the PLA Navy.

Philippine and US navies recently held large-scale exercises in the South China Sea, a development that seemed to inspire an aggressive PLA reaction.

The PLA Southern Theater Command conducted what it referred to as a “routine” patrol in the South China Sea, a development which only served to sharpen the US and Philippine focus on the China threat. Having more carriers in the region brings an unprecedented ability to project 5th-generation airpower from the sea well within reach of Taiwan and the South China Sea, which could dramatically change the deterrence equation. This is the case because, at the moment, China is only operating a few prototype J-31 sea-launched 5th-generation aircraft and has a 100-airplane strong J-20 force that is land-launched.

The PRC has no sea-launched F-35B or F-35C equivalent, and although Taiwan is only 100 miles from the coast and well within reach of mainland China, the PLA would likely have a very difficult time establishing any kind of air superiority in support of an amphibious attack on Taiwan. This equation would also be massively impacted should the US choose to deploy as many as 5 carriers in the region at one time.

The US Navy now regularly conducts dual-carrier war preparation drills wherein air-attack sorties are coordinated at a massive scale, doubling that kind of airpower projection capability could scale any air attack campaign to unparalleled levels not likely to be matched by any kind of PLA Air Force formation.