The SOFREP Team has seen fit to offer me a weekly column, and I have eagerly accepted the opportunity. SOFREP published a number of my past essays, and it became a frequent outlet for airing some of my more controversial conclusions. I’ve appreciated the editorial staff’s willingness to let me say what I believe to be true, and I think SOFREP has come to appreciate the hard research, historical context, and institutional mechanics that I apply in my analysis. I look forward to contributing to the SOF community dialog.
I considered how best to spend our first weeks together, and since we are about to begin a new political cycle with a new President and a new Congress, both of which ran on a basket of Government reforms in which the Department of Defense featured prominently, I figured now would be a good time to talk about healthy changes.
My column will begin with a multi-part series on my community—Army Special Forces. I will explain how the institution works, give voice to persistent challenges, and suggest reforms. In time, I’d like to cover other units in the SOF community (SEALs, Raiders, Rangers, PJs, CCTs, Civil Affairs, Psyops, etc.). I don’t hail from those communities and am a little less familiar with their challenges (and potential solutions), so I plan to allow for a great deal more time to conduct interviews. I will be slower in releasing this material.
Meanwhile, I am currently doing a deep dive into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This was the wartime intelligence service created by Wild Bill Donovan during World War II, and it served as the institutional foundation for the creation of the CIA in 1947 and Army Special Forces in 1952. The more war changes, the more it stays the same—or perhaps, times may change, technology may change, but people (especially warriors) do not. For this reason, there is wisdom in understanding the past.
The OSS pioneered modern American special operations, intelligence collection, and analysis, propaganda, covert action, and all of the dark arts belying these practices. We will dive into the OSS’ institutional mechanics, with pieces on the OSS Directorate of Strategic Services and Directorate of Intelligence Services, as well as pieces on the OSS Branches (Secret Intelligence, X-2, R&D, Foreign Nationalities, Censorship & Documents, Special Operations, Operational Group Command, Morale Operations, Maritime Unit, Field Experimental Unit, Special Projects, etc.). We will examine how OSS operatives trained and deployed. We will explore how British experts from MI6 and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) participated in the creation of the OSS, including floating Wild Bill Donovan’s name to President Roosevelt. We will analyze OSS missions (Detachment 101 in Burma, Detachment 202 China, Detachment 404 in Malaya and Thailand, Operation Jedburgh, etc.) and identify not only how those missions were successful, but which missions actually delivered value to their respective campaigns.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the OSS was the speed in which it was created, and the shocking proficiency shown by its novice personnel. In many ways, the OSS was truly American in the way its members grappled with the impossible, pioneered new methods, and journeyed out into the unknown.
Conversely, not all branches of the OSS really delivered value. Many OSS components were largely ineffective—despite a steep price tag and profound commitments in personnel, resources, and war materials.
My hope is that military thinkers, especially those of the SOF community, will harness this timeless example of espionage, special operations, risk-taking, leadership, competence, and human fallacy to examine best practices in USSOCOM and the U.S. Armed Services as a whole.
The SOFREP Team has seen fit to offer me a weekly column, and I have eagerly accepted the opportunity. SOFREP published a number of my past essays, and it became a frequent outlet for airing some of my more controversial conclusions. I’ve appreciated the editorial staff’s willingness to let me say what I believe to be true, and I think SOFREP has come to appreciate the hard research, historical context, and institutional mechanics that I apply in my analysis. I look forward to contributing to the SOF community dialog.
I considered how best to spend our first weeks together, and since we are about to begin a new political cycle with a new President and a new Congress, both of which ran on a basket of Government reforms in which the Department of Defense featured prominently, I figured now would be a good time to talk about healthy changes.
My column will begin with a multi-part series on my community—Army Special Forces. I will explain how the institution works, give voice to persistent challenges, and suggest reforms. In time, I’d like to cover other units in the SOF community (SEALs, Raiders, Rangers, PJs, CCTs, Civil Affairs, Psyops, etc.). I don’t hail from those communities and am a little less familiar with their challenges (and potential solutions), so I plan to allow for a great deal more time to conduct interviews. I will be slower in releasing this material.
Meanwhile, I am currently doing a deep dive into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This was the wartime intelligence service created by Wild Bill Donovan during World War II, and it served as the institutional foundation for the creation of the CIA in 1947 and Army Special Forces in 1952. The more war changes, the more it stays the same—or perhaps, times may change, technology may change, but people (especially warriors) do not. For this reason, there is wisdom in understanding the past.
The OSS pioneered modern American special operations, intelligence collection, and analysis, propaganda, covert action, and all of the dark arts belying these practices. We will dive into the OSS’ institutional mechanics, with pieces on the OSS Directorate of Strategic Services and Directorate of Intelligence Services, as well as pieces on the OSS Branches (Secret Intelligence, X-2, R&D, Foreign Nationalities, Censorship & Documents, Special Operations, Operational Group Command, Morale Operations, Maritime Unit, Field Experimental Unit, Special Projects, etc.). We will examine how OSS operatives trained and deployed. We will explore how British experts from MI6 and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) participated in the creation of the OSS, including floating Wild Bill Donovan’s name to President Roosevelt. We will analyze OSS missions (Detachment 101 in Burma, Detachment 202 China, Detachment 404 in Malaya and Thailand, Operation Jedburgh, etc.) and identify not only how those missions were successful, but which missions actually delivered value to their respective campaigns.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the OSS was the speed in which it was created, and the shocking proficiency shown by its novice personnel. In many ways, the OSS was truly American in the way its members grappled with the impossible, pioneered new methods, and journeyed out into the unknown.
Conversely, not all branches of the OSS really delivered value. Many OSS components were largely ineffective—despite a steep price tag and profound commitments in personnel, resources, and war materials.
My hope is that military thinkers, especially those of the SOF community, will harness this timeless example of espionage, special operations, risk-taking, leadership, competence, and human fallacy to examine best practices in USSOCOM and the U.S. Armed Services as a whole.
Sincerely and respectfully,
Curtis Fox
