Most public wargaming assessments published by places such as RAND and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggest that any major confrontation with China would likely begin with a massive salvo of ballistic missiles fired by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at Taiwan or US and US-allied maritime and land assets throughout the Pacific theater.
What this means is that any kind of surprise attack on Taiwan or US interests in the Pacific would include a large number of ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles fired at air defenses, bases with significant military platforms, and large maritime platforms such as aircraft carriers.
Such an attack, which should be considered quite realistic given China’s missile arsenal, would likely seek to destroy or overwhelm any air defense system or maritime platforms with sheer volume. This kind of tactical approach, often referred to as a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” by strategists, would be intended to simply fire so many missiles at key targets at one time that even the most advanced defenses would be unable to mount any successful defense.
The concept, as often articulated in Pentagon China reports, would be to quickly “annex” Taiwan or destroy US aircraft carriers in a position to defend Taiwan more rapidly than the US or Taiwan could respond.
This, according to public Pentagon yearly China reports, is referred to as “fait accompli,” a term describing a Chinese effort to occupy Taiwan so fast that it would simply be too costly in terms of potential casualties and costs to successfully “extricate” an occupying Chinese force from Taiwan.
However, given the size of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s land, air, and naval forces, such a task could be considered too difficult or monumental to attempt.
Most public wargaming assessments published by places such as RAND and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggest that any major confrontation with China would likely begin with a massive salvo of ballistic missiles fired by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at Taiwan or US and US-allied maritime and land assets throughout the Pacific theater.
What this means is that any kind of surprise attack on Taiwan or US interests in the Pacific would include a large number of ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles fired at air defenses, bases with significant military platforms, and large maritime platforms such as aircraft carriers.
Such an attack, which should be considered quite realistic given China’s missile arsenal, would likely seek to destroy or overwhelm any air defense system or maritime platforms with sheer volume. This kind of tactical approach, often referred to as a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” by strategists, would be intended to simply fire so many missiles at key targets at one time that even the most advanced defenses would be unable to mount any successful defense.
The concept, as often articulated in Pentagon China reports, would be to quickly “annex” Taiwan or destroy US aircraft carriers in a position to defend Taiwan more rapidly than the US or Taiwan could respond.
This, according to public Pentagon yearly China reports, is referred to as “fait accompli,” a term describing a Chinese effort to occupy Taiwan so fast that it would simply be too costly in terms of potential casualties and costs to successfully “extricate” an occupying Chinese force from Taiwan.
However, given the size of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s land, air, and naval forces, such a task could be considered too difficult or monumental to attempt.
Such thinking, as evidenced by the Pentagon, is a key reason why the US Navy makes great efforts to “forward position” its aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and air assets in the Pacific theater on routine missions. It may also be a key reason why the US rapidly increases its military presence in Japan and the Philippines with new bases and assets.
Can Aircraft Carriers Survive a China Attack?
A pressing question this kind of scenario would introduce is whether aircraft carriers operating within the strike range of China and Chinese forces are far too vulnerable to prove practical or valuable in any way.
China New Stealth Fighter. Image Credit: X Screenshot.
Indeed, such a question is highly relevant to Pentagon strategists seeking to strengthen the US and allied deterrence posture in the Pacific theater.
Essentially, would large numbers of ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles such as the DF-26 and DF-26B render carriers ineffective or even useless in any significant war engagement with China?
Would the best US Navy Carrier Strike Group layered defenses prove insufficient to blunt or stop a sudden surprise the PLA attack?
Such a question seems serious and tactically significant.
This would depend, to a large extent, on how close to shore aircraft carriers would need to operate and the ranges from which Carrier Strike Groups could project power.
This also depends upon the relative accuracy or precision-targeting systems built into Chinese anti-ship missiles.
US Navy Layered Ship Defenses
There are several critical variables regarding US Navy firepower, power projection capability, air attack potential, and integrated ship defenses.
The answer may need to be more definitive or clear, per say. However, it relies upon the existence of survivable aerial refuelers, drone swarms, and the scale and accuracy of non-kinetic countermeasures and defenses.
MD-19 Drone from China
Given that even a large group of ship-fired US Navy interceptor missiles, deck-mounted guns, and Aegis radar-enabled target tracking might need to be equipped to counter a large number of incoming missiles, a traditional kinetic response with SM-3s or SM-6s is likely to
Close-in interceptor weapons and even precision-fired deck-mounted guns and missiles might also prove ineffective against a salvo, given a lack of ability to scale strikes and targeting against a group of missiles at once.
EW & Laser to Counter Chinese Missiles Fired at Aircraft Carriers
However, non-kinetic defenses such as electronic warfare (EW) jamming might prove effective depending on the detection accuracy and range.
Should targeted EW defenses be used quickly and precisely, it would seem conceivable that several incoming missiles could be “jammed,” “disabled,” or thrown off course.
Yet another possibility, which was recently proven in the Red Sea by US Navy carriers intercepting Houthi drones and missiles, would be to use forward-positioned air assets such as drones, armed drones, and even fighter jets to track and destroy attacking Chinese missiles from beyond the standard radar horizon.
For instance, the US Navy’s Commander of Carrier Strike Group 2 in the Red Sea, Rear Adm. Javon Hakimsadeh (Known as Hak), told me that in one instance, a carrier-launched F-18 Growler aircraft was able to “see” and “intercept” incoming Houthi drones from the air and use an air-to-air AIM-9X Sidewinder missile to destroy them.
If armed with cutting-edge technology such as a Next-Gen Jammer (NGJ), an F/A-18 could potentially track the number of EW signatures at one time with sufficient ability to locate and “jam” them from the air.
Aviation Machinist’s Mate 2nd Class Ryan Rogers launches an EA-18G Growler from USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), 2020. (US Navy)
The now-emerging NGJ, for instance, can track a number of signals at one time and effectively deconflict the spectrum to target individual missiles across a range of frequencies.
Laser interceptors would be another option, should they be sufficiently “scaled.” For example, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency has been working on “power-scaling” laser weapons for ship-fired missile defenses.
This, while underway and showing promise, is complicated by the need to generate, store, and sustain the requisite amount of mobile power sources capable of supporting a large, wide-reaching arsenal of laser interceptors.
MQ-25 Drone Refuelers?
Another possibility is to use a tanker aircraft such as an MQ-25 Stingray platform to double the attack range of Carrier and amphib-launched F-35s and F-35Cs.
An F-35C, for example, operates with an overall range of about 1,300 nautical miles.
If this could be doubled using an unmanned aerial refueler, then carriers might be in a position to successfully project power from more than 2,000 miles offshore.
Drone Swarm Countermeasures
Alongside this, the arguably most significant potential defense against a Chinese salvo of ballistic missiles was published by a RAND think tank essay called “The Technologies Which Could Defeat a Chinese Missile Barrage.”
Sailors aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and CVW-2 perform a “flight deck spell out” in the Pacific, 2008. (US Navy)
The Rand essay, published in 2023, says “multi-domain drone mimics” such as drone swarms could confuse China’s ability to track targets.
“Large numbers of low-cost, uncrewed air and maritime vehicles would confuse China’s battlespace awareness and complicate its ability to identify high-value targets. These drone mimics could also have the benefit of creating the perception of a larger coalition force, drawing Chinese forces to incorrect locations, or causing them to expend advanced munitions on false targets,” the RAND paper says.
Building on this idea, why not take “Hak’s” discussion of how a fighter-jet drone intercepted Houthi drones a step further in the realm of possibility and consider launching a drone swarm from a more extensive air platform at a stand-off range such as a C-130 or B-52?
The drone swarms could “blanket” an area beyond the horizon with surveillance, perform critical high-volume targeting operations, and even explode or “jam” the incoming missiles themselves,
Air-launched Drone Swarm?
An air-launched drone swarm does seem to make sense as an effective “jamming” or countermeasure option when viewed in light of “Hak’s” description of the challenges in the Red Sea.
Target discernment and discrimination are of critical importance in the Red Sea in particular, Hak said, because of how “challenging” and “cluttered” the Red Sea combat environment is.
This contingency, similar to what US forces might see in a large-scale Chinese attack, seems like the kind of challenge an air-launched swarm might be well-positioned to counter.
The Rand analysis also mentions the use of advanced “algorithmic” decoys, “smart mines,” “rapid language and target signal identification and translation,” and, perhaps of most tremendous significance, advanced, secure multi-domain networking.
