The following piece, written by Peter Huessy, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.
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The US is indeed facing two nuclear-armed peer adversaries in China and Russia, which are projected to have combined as many as 11,000 strategic and theater nuclear warheads by 2035, some multiple thousands greater than their combined number of warheads today.
A key question is to what extent do nuclear weapon numbers matter? Certainly, they should in any treaty that mandates force levels, although the 1972 SALT I limits on ICBMs and SLBMs were unequal in Russia’s favor. But in the seven proposed strategic nuclear weapons treaties between the United States and the USSR, and then Russia, the numbers of warheads allowed for each side were the same, although deployed differently.
A 1983 US government assessment noted that prior to the first arms deal in 1965, the US had 6000 strategic warheads vs the USSR at 600. By 1983, the assessment further explained that after the SALT I/II treaties of 1972 and 1979, respectively, the US had 8900 strategic warheads and the USSR had 7800. And at the time, the assessment projected that by 1993, absent arms control [such as the proposed START agreements to reduce nuclear weapons], the USSR would have between 14,000 and 23,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
Looking forward, absent new arms control agreements, the 2010 New START agreement expires in February 2026. The future nuclear balance may be very disparate even after the current US nuclear modernization plans are completed. That may have political consequences for the US public, Congress, and our allies. And may lead our adversaries to miscalculate and take risks threatening US interests.
However, if the United States has sufficient warheads to cover all of the targets of deterrent interest in Russia, China, and North Korea (plus a reserve), does it need even more nuclear warheads above that number simply because the Russians and Chinese forces combined are much larger?
The Posture Commission of October 2023 addressed this question and concluded that while the US may need a greater future nuclear deterrent capability, the United States did not necessarily have to match the Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons forces “warhead for warhead” for targeting/deterrent purposes while also concluding (with strong caveats about the future) the US nuclear deterrent was strong today.
The Current Situation
Having said that, it is without question the recapitalization of the TRIAD is required. And for a myriad of reasons including these three keys:
- End of life/operational viability of the current nuclear fleet (MM III, B-52H, B-2, Ohio, NAOC).
- Cost of sustaining legacy weapons systems coupled with lack of vendor support.
- Operational threats that require modernization—as the operational margin would be insufficient.
Recapitalization of the TRIAD does not equate to an arms race. In fact it’s absolutely the opposite. The US is the only nuclear armed nation that is executing a rationale, deliberate, and balanced TRIAD recapitalization. The US strategic posture and weapons system capability are dictated by what the US is required to hold at risk for deterrence objectives both today and in the future and is not based on an artificial number based on other nations stockpiles.
Every single US nuclear modernization program is also required to assess the feasibility and cost of an alternative service life extension (SLEP) on the current weapons systems. When examined, a SLEP has been determined to be greater in cost and the capabilities less while facing an ever-increasing threat from China, Russia, North Korea and an aspirational Iran. And even not technically feasible.
The current New Start Treaty expires in Feb 2026 well before any of the current recapitalization programs are operationally fielded, so although they are “compliant” with the existing treaty, it will not be in force when fielded. But it is important to point out that the modernization force would be completely consistent with New Start even if the treaty were still in force. And thus hardly initiating some kind of “arms race.”
The last 11 administrations, political party agnostic, have studied the threat and our national security needs and directed our nation maintain a TRIAD. If the country is going to explore other national security needs or whether or not the country can “afford” the nuclear recapitalization, the nation’s leaders must also ask whether the nation can “afford” not to do a recap with the subsequent impact to our national security and those of America’s allies to whom the American deterrence umbrella is extended. In short, if America does not aggressively pursue the recapitalization of the TRIAD, the country will by default mortgage our standing as a world power.
Background
Before laying out as assessment of the US nuclear enterprise in the context of other nuclear threats, some points need to be made about the US modernization effort, especially about cost and alternatives to modernization and current deterrent strategy.
First, as noted the US modernization effort of acquiring a minimum of (from the 2018 NPR) 12 Columbia class submarines, the requisite number of D-5 missiles, (16 per submarine), the 400 Sentinel ICBMs, and some at least of the 100 nuclear capable B21 “Raider” strategic bombers are entirely consistent with the 2010 New START nuclear arms agreement and US obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In short, the US modernization effort is consistent with international law and is not in any way engineering or beginning an “arms race.” It is insulting to the nuclear industry given their heroic work to overcome multiple decades of nuclear neglect to claim their current work is somehow endangering US security through pursuing some kind of “arms race.”
Second, the cost of the US nuclear modernization is not $1.2 trillion over thirty years as CBO (the Congressional Budget Office) claimed in their initial 2010 assessment. A very large portion of the cost of the nuclear enterprise is supporting the legacy US nuclear forces that are now aging, are being kept well beyond their intended life-cycle, and are costing more each year and will within the next decades go out of service due to operational, technological and cost factors that can only be marginally changed. Sustaining the old force is NOT modernization. It will be largely replaced through modernization and the distinction is important.
In fact, as SAC defense subcommittee member Senator John Hoeven explained at a TRIAD conference in September 2024, the research development, test, evaluation and acquisition costs of the new modernized Triad elements are $19 billion in FY2026 as approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee and $17.4 billion for FY2025. By comparison, the overall nuclear enterprise in the current fiscal year (FY2025) costs a total of $52 billion, (including only the portion of the B21 Raider program to be in the nuclear role and not the full planned acquisition of 100 strategic B-2 bombers, although they are all nuclear capable.) But this budget includes all the cost of maintaining the legacy systems and in addition roughly $17.4 billion for the new modernized elements of the nuclear TRIAD including bombers, cruise missiles, submarines, submarine launched missiles and ICBMs.
Third, the choice isn’t between keeping or extending the life of what we now have, exercising “restraint” and foregoing modernization vs the current modernization program of record.
As Senator Shaheen of New Hampshire has explained, relying on our legacy systems only and not modernizing risks the danger of the US as Clark Murdock warned “rusting to obsolescence.” And as the administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Dr. Jill Hruby has also pointed out, the $22 billion NNSA budget (part of the overall $52 billion referenced earlier) is in part necessary to sustain the US nuclear warheads without which the US would have to get out of the nuclear business.
In short, as former Commander of the US Strategic Command Admiral Charles Richard has underscored, the alternative to modernization is not keeping what we have but it means unilaterally disarming and thus getting out of the nuclear deterrent business.
These are the only two choices. Modernize or disarm.
Fourth, however much some may seek a nuclear weapons free world, there is zero chance any such deal is on the horizon. As North Korea’s leader is purported to have told a US official about the idea of global zero being adopted by the DPRK, “Sure, you first.” Therefore, claims that the US nuclear deterrent strategy is immoral, or in the words of best-selling author Annie Jacobson “mad,” are dangerous. What would be the current alternative? If nuclear deterrence won’t work as Jacobson and the New York Times both argue, in her book “Nuclear War: A Scenario” and the Times series “At the Brink,” respectively, they both have an obligation to tell us what is the alternative. Like previous nuclear initiatives such as the nuclear freeze, such ideas as “global nuclear zero” have to be tested in the context of the real world.
The Nuclear Balance
The United States
The US nuclear deterrent consists of those forces currently in the field, as well as those that could be placed in the field in a relatively short period of time, and the overall force that in the much longer term could be fielded by the United States. The New START agreement of 2010 laid out what force could be deployed, but it did not restrict the total available inventory of nuclear warheads the US maintained as a “hedge” in case the assumptions that underpinned the New START agreement might change. That hedge gives the United States a total of about 3100 strategic long-range nuclear warheads we could deploy over time compared to the near 1700-2000 we could deploy today.
Currently the US can deploy up to 1090 Ohio class submarine based warheads as allowed by the New START agreement, with some number less than that now being deployed day-to-day. For our ICBM Minuteman force, we have very close to all 400 missiles and their 400 warheads deployed, (actual alert rates are 99.5%). In addition, New START rules allow the United States upward of 60 B2 and B52 strategic bombers, none of which are now on-alert on a day to day basis. These bombers can each carry from 8-20 gravity bombs or cruise missiles.
The US now has 14 Ohio class submarines but only 12 are counted as deployed[this is to the US benefit because in previous treaties we were assessed for submarines in overhaul], each with 20 D-5 missiles. The US has 400 Minuteman III missiles, and 60 nuclear strategic bombers. But starting in 2032, the Columbia class submarine and the Sentinel ICBM will gradually replace our legacy systems so that between 2035-42 the US should have fully modernized at least 652 strategic nuclear platforms, (192 sub missiles, 400 Sentinel ICBMs, and 60 strategic bombers, although some legacy system ICBMs may remain in the force through 2050.
Now the US could add 50 ICBM silos still available but not now used. The Sentinel or in the interim the Minuteman III missiles could hold 1-3 warheads and thus increase (an arbitrary guess on my part) the US deployed arsenal by 500 warheads. Similarly, the existing D-5 missile can carry up to 8 warheads and if all 192 missiles aboard 12 Columbia class submarines were loaded, the US could deploy 1536 SLBM warheads. And with 60 strategic bombers each with a notional 10-12 weapons, the US bombers could be deployed with some 600-720 warheads. All combined, the US could over time deploy some 1536 +800+720 warheads, or 3056 warheads, somewhat short of the warheads available in our nation’s stockpile. (Some 300 additional warheads are gravity bombs that could be deployed aboard regional/theater capable US and NATO allies’ fighter plans based in Europe—none are now currently deployed in the Pacific.)
Russia
First, Russia no longer abides by the New START agreement. Second, a number of Russian strategically capable systems are not counted against the New START treaty limits. Third, because Russia places so many of its warheads on large, multiple warhead capable missiles, it only deploys roughly 540 what are termed SNDV or Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles although the New START agreement allows 700 SNDVs. That means the Russians could add considerably more such platforms and thus thousands of additional warheads if they wished to do so given the relative size of their arsenal today. Fourth, to fit within the New START limits, Russia is assumed by the US State Department to have [until recently] limited its warheads per missile to a number consistent with the New START agreement, especially as required treaty inspections have stopped being issued.
If Russia uploaded with more warheads per its currently deployed long range nuclear systems, the Russian strategic nuclear force would easily exceed 3500 deployed warheads, without having to add any additional land based or sea based missiles than what they have today. Mark Schneider of NIPP and Chris Yeaw of the University of Nebraska both project Russia’s strategic nuclear force is headed to 3500-4500 warheads by the middle of the next decade.
China
As for China, the current buildup has been described by retired Admiral Charles Richard as “breathtaking.” The current nuclear force is around 600 strategic long range deployed warheads, having grown by at least 100 this past year. The Chinese are building the H-20 stealth bombers, 096 SSBNs or submarines, and the land based missiles DF-45/51s, all of which are in some stage of development and acquisition.
Included in the Chinese force structure are 360 new ICBM silos, along with 150 mobile ICBMs. And 100 new DF-45/51 missiles some of which may be rail mobile plus a long range DF-27 are in development. In addition, six to eight submarines may be built, each with up to 12-14 JL-2 or JL-3 missiles, with the latter having multiple warheads.
The ICBM silos are capable of holding the DF-31 or DF-41 which each have between 3-10 warheads, respectively. The submarines will carry the JL-3 or JL-4 missile, with the capability to carry some 1-4 warheads each. The US Navy Pacific commander says the PRC is currently beginning to deploy the advanced multiple warhead submarine launched ballistic missile.
And finally, the PRC has some 150 H-6 and H-6K strategic bombers, each with the capability of deploying 6 and potentially 12 nuclear weapons including cruise missiles.
The current build or acquisition rate of these multiple systems is 1-2 years in the near term and 4-5 years for the long term. Projected from today’s level China will have in 2035 at least 1400 strategic long range nuclear warheads .
Theater Nuclear Weapons
In addition, China and Russia have what are termed theater or regional, short range nuclear weapons. Officially, Russia has 1900 such weapons according to the US intelligence services, while China according to unofficial estimates is estimated to have only a few hundred. According to Yeaw and Schneider, however, Russia could easily have 4000 such theater weapons today. As for China, Yeaw says China today has 578 theater weapons and by 2035 he projects that China will have 2184 such weapons.
Taking this data int account, combined, Russia will have some 7500 theater and strategic warheads by 2035 and China will have some 3500. There are no technological barriers to this projected growth. The PRC is building new production facilities for nuclear weapons grade material, with significant help from Moscow. And the balance reviewed here does not include the current North Korea force, nor what Iran might produce. As for Israeli, French and British forces those are estimated to collectively be around a hundred warheads for each arsenal.
Summary & Conclusion
The US faces within the next decade the prospects of two nuclear armed peer adversaries with between a three or five to one advantage in deployed (in the field) nuclear weapons. Between a three and four to one disparity would occur even if the United States implemented a near 50% hedge increase in its own nuclear forces over the next decade although some force increases and uploading may not be make sense for logistical, operational or budgetary reasons.
The US has some options that need to be seriously considered. The United States should accelerate and expand the Congressionally mandated Navy nuclear armed regionally capable cruise missile program, which the Congress has put in the budget and the Navy has now determined to support. The number of such submarine based cruise missiles that would be deployed has not been determined but such missiles are needed to strengthen regional nuclear deterrence in the NATO and Pacific regions.
The United States should also build more Columbia class submarines as called for by the Strategic Posture Commission but given the limits of our shipyard capacity, that new acquisition which would expand the existing planned buy of 12 boats but might not begin until 2043 although building a new shipyard should certainly be reviewed to speed up such acquisition. The United States should also increase the planned buy of B-21 Raiders to as many as 200 aircraft and seriously consider also increasing the planned buy of LRSO cruise missiles. The need to expand the US nuclear deterrent capability is certainly now understood. Its exact dimensions need to be determined by the new administration, and this essay is an initial attempt to help with that process.
