Counter-Drone Lessons From Ukraine War – Reader Submission

The following piece, written by Brig (Retd) Ian Cameron-Mowat, first appeared on Warrior Maven, a Military Content Group member website.

Before 2022, a piece on Counter-UAS (unmanned aerial system) Lessons would have highlighted the use of drones – both military and improvised – by the likes of Islamic State, Azerbaijan, Turkey in northern Syria, and, of course, by Russia in various theatres. Now, the focus is much sharper. The drone war centered around Ukraine is at a level of intensity – indeed, ferocity – simply never seen before. That is why it is right at this time to ponder on C-UAS lessons from this major war in Europe. What’s happening there now affects us all. An important disclaimer! I’ve taken the material for this piece from open sources, including Russian and Ukrainian ones. I’ve pointed out systems produced by a number of different companies, and I have no commercial or professional links to any of them. Especially Kalashnikov.

Threat

First off, we need to define the drone threat. I won’t deal here with the likes of the Kinzhal (or Dagger) hypersonic ballistic missiles used by Moscow with varying degrees of success; it’s not a drone, and neither are the long-range, high-speed cruise missiles launched primarily by air and naval platforms. That’s a problem for conventional air defense, and that’s not what we’re addressing here. Drones are primarily used for surveillance, intelligence gathering, propaganda, and strikes. Additionally, drones are used to help direct and conduct strikes.

At the beginning of the war, Ukrainian forces used armed military drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 to target the Russian column headed for Kyiv. A TB2 drone may also have been used to distract the defenses of the Russian flagship Moskva while naval missiles attacked and ultimately sank it. Intelligence gathered by drones is also used to direct artillery. The most remarkable aspect of drone use in this war is the large number of civilian drones. Quadcopters and other rotor drones are mainly produced by commercial firms such as the Chinese DJI and are among the most common.

Armed systems, such as the TB2 or, on the Russian side, the Orion drone, carry missiles that can be used to attack troops on the ground. So-called kamikaze drones, or loitering munitions, single-use drones, which hover above a target before diving into it and exploding on it, are also used extensively, especially by Russia but more recently for the attacks on Moscow.

For the Russians, most of that capability is now bought in from Iran, although measures are in place to enable manufacture in Russia itself. These are the Shahed 136 / 1311 systems, or Geran in Russian service, prop-driven slow speed drones with a 1000+ km range which in some respects remind me of the V1 weapons of the Second World War. I remember my parents describing what it was like to live under the threat of the ‘doodlebugs’ in London in the 1940s; I don’t think many of us expected to see or hear that threat again in Europe in the 21st century. But now, with an Iridium-powered comms unit, an inertial back-up navigation system and success against Saudi oil installations and almost strategic reach, time to think again?

Ukraine, of course, has not been idle. A drone industry was already developing before the 2022 invasion, but with Government, private and crowd-funding initiatives creating a whole domestic ecosystem, systems such as the Bober (Beaver), looking much like the Shahed, appear to have caused problems as far away as Moscow. Systems such as the Shahed / Geran or the Bober are used to strike beyond the front line and into the depth of the enemy. These ‘Low and slow’ can be a problem for conventional air defense systems, but facing the threat, the switch of surveillance, EW and even kinetic air defense systems from the front line to major population centers may dissipate C-UAS deployments along the front lines in Ukraine.

Other drones are of course deployed: they include the Russian Orlan 10 artillery spotting system and the Turkish Bayraktar in use by Ukraine. And that’s before you take into account a range of loitering munitions, such as Kalashnikov’s Lancet and Kub. Ukraine is also receiving drones from abroad, whether commercial or specifically defence systems. Shorter range, purely tactical systems can take the form of purely commercial quadcopter systems such as the Chinese DJI range, especially the Mavic.

Closer to the war, Latvia-based Atlas Dynamics provide the more robust and jam-resistant AtlasPRO system, and have opened an R&D office in Ukraine itself. These quadcopter or (in the case of the AtlasPRO) tricopter systems are routinely used for surveillance, artillery spotting, grenade attacks or full suicide missions; the internet is full of videos of the last in particular. Right down at the micro level, Teledyne FLIR’s Black Hornet has also been procured in large numbers for Ukraine.

Countermeasures an assessment of the effectiveness of countermeasures swiftly runs into the obstacles of deception, propaganda, operational security and national sensitivities. Some facts are known, however.

Electronic Warfare

Russia’s investment in EW over the years has given it powerful capabilities for the C-UAS fight. Earlier this year, Russia claimed that it was able to bring down about 90 percent of Ukrainian drones through jamming; life in Ukraine is becoming difficult for commercial drones in particular.

RUSI also estimates that Ukraine is losing 10,000 drones per month; this shows how many are in use and being procured. Hence the emphasis on the robustness of systems such as the frequency-scanning, frequency-hopping AtlasPRO; and hence the queasiness in some parts of NATO at the West’s EW shortfalls as part of the wishful thinking of the ‘peace dividend’ at the end of the Cold War.

C-UAS EW systems with a useful range come at a cost, but some of this is also being supplied to Ukraine. Blighter’s Anti-UAV Defence System (AUDS) is an example; its provision to Ukraine was announced this summer. Manpack counter-drone equipment is mostly repurposed or further tuned Counter-IED equipment; it can have some protective effect through disrupting drone communications or navigation at short ranges. Some systems aim to take control of the drone, but that’s a more specialist operation.

Innovation doesn’t stop at conventional EW; the Russian arsenal includes counterdrone rifles such as the multi-frequency PARS-S Stepashka, introduced this year. In the early months of the war, a RUSI report stated that quadcopters on the front line only lasted three flights on average before jamming defeated them.

As an example of capability on the Ukrainian side, the British firm SteelRock is providing its Nightfighter system through Norway for Ukraine.

But EW is not the classic ‘silver bullet’; systems with inertial navigation capabilities, sophisticated communications links and preprogrammed strike systems can be highly resistant. Kinetic Responses Ukraine has formed mobile air-defence teams equipped with a variety of shortrange and portable weapons, including self-propelled anti-aircraft guns such as the Soviet-era Shilka and the Germanmade Gepard, shoulder-fired missiles like the US-made Stinger, and even Sovietdesigned DShK heavy machine guns paired with searchlights and mounted on pick-up trucks.

Note that Shahed drones are highly susceptible even to conventional, oldschool anti-aircraft guns – that is, if they are detected in time to engage them.

But, made of light materials and flying close to the ground, they are difficult to acquire on radar. Another system which proved highly effective from early on is the Gepard, the old stalwart of Cold War air defence. In particular it dealt serious damage to Shahed swarm attacks on Kiev. The problem, though, became the ammunition – Swiss legislation prevented export and a work-around had to be found. Echoing the pick-up theme, L3Harris is under a US Government contract to deliver 14 VAMPIRE laser-guided rocket systems by the end of 2023.

The International Fund for Ukraine – administered by the UK but working with Northern European partners – funds equipment and training programmes for Ukraine. As part of its C-UAS drive, £56M has been spend on acquiring CORTEX Typhon counter-drone systems, where the Teledyne FLIR and Kongsberg RWS systems are mounted on Dingo 2 vehicles.

Systems like the Orlan 10, however, fly too high for anti-aircraft guns to engage, so a radar-guided surface to air missile capability is still required.

Other Stuff There’s a lot of other ‘stuff’ in the works or already deployed, though not necessarily yet in Ukraine. This ranges from hawks with Kevlar mittens, through counter-drone drones, through closein net guns from the likes of the UK’s Openworks Engineering, to lasers. Some of it will in the end prove to be highly effective.

So for C-UAS, what can we say? l We need to detect drones as far as possible from the target l We still need ‘classic’ and expensive air defense to defeat some high-flying targets

• Electronic warfare is extremely powerful, but is not a complete answer
• Closer to the ground, missiles and guns are essential. And given the pervasiveness of the threat everywhere in Ukraine, that capability needs to be… pretty much everywhere
• The C-UAS battle is not a field just for air defense specialists.

These capabilities also need to be in the hands of every unit, because every unit is under threat. But most importantly, success relies on the human mind. Again and again we see Ukrainian versatility and speed of adaptation; but never forget that the enemy has a vote, and the Russians are not slow to adapt either in this C-UAS battle.

In many ways, to many of us, this doesn’t really feel like air defense; this feels like the counter-IED fight all over again. A different threat, some different technology, but fast-changing, deadly, and critical to the success of operations.

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Brig (Retd) Ian Cameron-Mowat is a former Head of Force Protection UK Defence Equipment and Support